Accident Report - Fatal Aide Climb

I've been debating whether or not to post this information here, but my reasons for not doing it were all bad ones. Namingly, I wanted to escape public ridicule, avoid getting angry at harsh criticism and not create an association with the event that would dominate what could losely be termed my 'reputation.' I have only climbed with one former rec.climber, Taylor Shull, and he and I are now friends. Several years ago he lost a friend in El Dorado. He was there as his partner died. Unfortunately, I now share that same history.

The most interesting topic that could be discussed in this thread, I think, isn't about the tragedy of the accident I was involved in. It is mainly about the psychology of the decision making done by those involved. I knew the person who died fairly well, as well as one could know someone for 11 years. His areas of knowledge and experience were well known in his field. I learned some things I didn't know about him recently in talking with friends. But his mindset is speculation on my part. I can only tell you why I did what I did and what scares me about it. I can only tell you how I came to ignore things I 'knew.' The fact is, I had knowledge that should have set off warning sirens in my head. They didn't, and I know now why. I substituted faith in my friend's judgement for making my own decisions. I avoided questioning his designs out of some form of twisted respect. I did ultimately deviate from what my climbing partner did, and that I think improved the odds that I would live.

When you read this accident report, you may feel the revulsion such things can envoke. It may even anger you. The mistakes in judgement that were made are extremely stupid, in my own opinion. I have used even harsher language for my own actions in the company of friends. If you feel you need to voice these same opinions, you are welcome to. I will not be offended, because I understand the gesture. I have indulged in the practice myself in the past when it concerned others, usually novices.

There is more than one lesson to be noted in this accident report. I'm sure more than one person will be interested in adding what they have come to understand about these lessons. I may read some of the responses to this post, but I'm not sure how many. My only commitment now is to myself and to my friends that I climb and cave with. That commitment is to obtain and use knowledge of safe climbing practices independently of what my friends know, and not rely exclusively on someone who has a good reputation. I have also decided to stop procrastinating and learn self- resuce techniques, namingly setting up a haul system, escaping the belay and rope ascending using minimal gear.

Here's the link to the report. It contains jpegs, downloadable pdf files and links to websites with other information you may find useful. I wrote large sections of the report and parts of the conclusion. I also did the accident scene illustration and the belay setup diagram. I did not, however, design this setup. I only used it. It is miraculous that I am not dead myself.

0-9 Well Cave bolting accident report:
http://psprouse.home.texas.net/09/

It has been noted that there are three types of accidents:

* those involving novices who had poor equipment and/or lacked training and made mistakes * those involving acts of nature that were unforseeable, like rockfall * and those that involve experienced climbers who for some reason had a lapse of judgement and did the wrong thing

-Tim Stich

No criticism from me. It's too easy to jeer from the peanut gallery.

Am truly sorry about your loss.

Tim

An excellent post mortem, something that can be very hard to do objectively when you've lost a friend. Writing this may help keep history from repeating itself with another party.

I would add, based on 10+ mishap investigations in the Navy, some of which I was an investigator and some in which I was investigated, that every mishap has a common theme. There was no one single thing that caused the mishap, or allowed it to occur. It is *always* a chain of small decisions, lapses in judgement, or oversights that lead to the mishap. Removing any one of the links in the chain and someone who perished walks away instead. This accident has that characteristic in spades.

We have all done things we shouldn't have done and very often have gotten away with it, this puts it in perspective.

I am sorry for your loss and wish you strength.

Bas

Hi, Tim! Very sorry for Your loss! It's is a horrible thing for anyone to live through. You are a very good person, and I am sure any error in judgement on Your part must have been a result of putting too much faith in Your friend's judgement. And he was a very well established experienced caver.

It looks like a large portion of accidents happen to very experienced climbers. Maybe experience and having gotten away with things for years makes one more arrogant? Who knows, maybe probability is just increased with the number of years You put Yourself in danger.

Olga

A climber who has climbed a few thousand pitches has taken a lot more rolls of the dice than one who has only climbed a few dozen, even though his odds of surviving per roll may be a bit better than for the novice. Per pitch climbed, I'll bet that the largest proportion of accidents happen to novices, even though more experienced climbers may tend to get on more dangerous routes.

Tim, my condolences.

Private pilots often talk about a 'danger period' in experience. I forget the exact number of hours in the air - i believe it is in the small hundreds. Whatever the number, pilots in that range have a disproportiate number of the accidents. The thinking is that they have enough hours to have gotten (too) comforable in the air and with their checklists and they start making poor decisions like skipping parts of the checklist. More novice pilots are not yet comfortable and are more likely to do every little thing by the book. The more experienced pilots have either re-learned to not take shortcuts or are just better judges of what shortcuts one can take and live.

Has anyone done any kind of statistical analysis on the accidents to see if there is a similar 'danger zone' of experience with climbers?

I'm not aware of any such statistical analysis, but my own subjective observation is that yes, a similar 'danger zone' exists for climbers, at about 2 years of regular outdoor climbing. This may coincide with a level of experience at which the climber begins to get on more dangerous and committing routes, in addition to perhaps getting sloppy and/or cocky. It's a level where you know a little, but not quite as much as you think you do. That's my experience, anyway.

You are correct. It's right around 4-600 hours.

I have over 12,000 and shake my head at past mistakes while in that zone.

However, I still am susceptible to error even at the airline level. Complacency is one of the biggest causes of airline crashes and am sure in climbing, too.

Tim

An amazing and tragic story..

All by people who can't control everything all the time, even when they feel otherwise - hence the reason to add margin whenever possible, not subtract it.

Thanks,

- Nate

I am sure any error in judgement on

I mainly fault myself for laziness in not questioning the system more. Someone else was doing the work. That pisses me off that I did that. I had my doubts, but I didn't speak up enough. That's bullshit.

Arrogance was a key personality element, for both of us I think. There's no doubt about that. Joe was a great guy and most people would agree, but he tended to do things his way to a fault. He could be convinced to do otherwise, but he did not seek out the advice in all cases. He consulted friends from time to time, but he also did a lot of experimenting alone. While commendable, he experimented on himself, and, on me.

Who knows, maybe probability is just

Looking at the chronology of the three trips, a total of three falls occurred before the fatal fall. In each fall, a very benign result was shown. This further bolstered our faith in the system. We were not fully realizing that it had not been tested under all possible conditions. The fall factors were all well below 2. Joe's fatal fall was undoubtably a factor 2 fall, since we suspect his first piece after the belay blew.

This lesson is obvious for multi-pitch trad climbing as well. A hanging belay anchor is going to be subjected to a fall factor 2 if you peel before getting a piece in, assuming you are climbing straight up. The distance you get from the belayer may not make that much of a difference. It is probably a good idea to get one piece in very early to help that situation.

-Tim